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REVIEW
Ending Insult to Injury, JEFFREY O'CONNELL, University of Illinois
Press, Chicago, 1975. Pp. xx, 254. $7.95.
Walter J. Blumt
In Ending Insult to Injury, a book addressed to a wide audience,
Jeffrey O'Connell provides an ingenious preliminary blueprint for
establishing beachheads of no-fault insurance coverage outside the
area of automobile accidents, to which it is now confined.
O'Connell, who (along with Robert E. Keeton) instilled life into
the concept of no-fault auto insurance,' acknowledges that the conditions that enabled the launching of an auto compensation plan are
peculiar to the auto accident situation. In the vast majority of auto
accidents the injury to the victim is readily linked to the activity of
driving a car. Moreover, most motorists already carry a good deal
of liability insurance, and a large percentage of all auto victims are
hurt while driving or riding in cars covered by liability insurance.'
The essence of the no-fault auto plan innovation was to switch much
of this insurance from third-party liability coverage to first-party
accident coverage. In most cases a victim would then seek
compensation from the carrier that underwrote protection for the
car he occupied at the time of an accident; his recovery under the
insurance would be divorced from the conduct of the drivers involved in the accident.'
The proponents of no-fault auto plans contended that this
transformation could be engineered without an increase in the cost
of insurance if victims were denied recovery for certain types of
damage compensable under the traditional tort system, such as
pain and suffering, loss of earnings above a certain ceiling, or damages for which the victim was entitled to payment from other
sources. The key trade-off was to provide limited compensation for
all (or nearly all) auto accident victims by reducing the recovery
available to the smaller number of victims who could succeed in
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actions under the fault principle. This trade-off was buttressed by
the expectation that the average cost of processing a reparations
claim would be lessened under the no-fault system, which did not
call for establishing fault or translating pain and suffering into dollars, so that a larger fraction of the premium dollar would end up
(more promptly) in the pockets of victims instead of in the hands
of lawyers and others who participated in the processing of claims.4
O'Connell's plan in Ending Insult to Injury is to extend this
trade-off to those accident victims who suffer injuries connected
either with the use of products other than autos or with the consumption of services. In the present climate it is most unlikely that
legislation could be passed to compel such a trade-off, primarily
because the high cost of the insurance would obviously raise the
prices of the services and goods. Rather than fight on this front,
O'Connell proposes the enactment of legislation that would enable
manufacturers or sellers of products and providers of services to
elect the trade-off for those victims whose injuries are connected
with their product or service.' An enterprise (or professional person)
electing the trade-off would have to institute and finance the equivalent of no-fault insurance coverage for any injury encompassed by
the election.' The victim whose injury came within the terms of the
trade-off could recover under this insurance, but he would lose a
substantial part of whatever rights he would otherwise have had
under the usual tort rules. Recovery would be limited to those economic losses (presumably limited by some ceiling) and those medical expenses not compensable from other sources-such as an employee health plan, an accident or medical insurance policy, a government program, or the like. In the case of enterprises engaged in
activities designated as "ultra-hazardous," the trade-off might even
7
be compelled by legislation rather than left on an elective basis.
The following illustration may be useful in illuminating this
pioneering proposal for an elective trade-off. Smith bought at retail
a soundly constructed household ladder manufactured by a company that had opted for the trade-off.' At another store he pur4 Id. at 274-84.
J. O'CONNELL at 97.
1 According to O'Connell this election could be broad or narrow, depending solely on the
choice of the manufacturer or provider of services. Id. at 99, 104.
7 Id. at 127.
8 The choice of a ladder as the no-fault product is not as fanciful as it might seem at
first glance. As O'Connell notes in listing a number of potentially dangerous consumer products, 125,000 to 200,000 injuries a year result from the use of ladders. Id. at 19. Elsewhere
O'Connell also describes ladder manufacturing as an enterprise "entailing distinctive risks
of personal injury." Id. at 90.
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chased sport shoes that fit him poorly, and, not long ago, pursuant
to an examination, he acquired new eyeglasses that blur his vision
slightly. On a fair day Smith, fortified by a few beers, tries out the
ladder. Upon reaching the top his foot slips out of the new sport
shoe; he then tries to wiggle his foot back into the shoe but is
impeded by the distortion of vision attributable to the new eyeglasses and perhaps by an impairment in motor response attributable to drinking the beer; in the end he falls off the ladder and
sustains very serious injuries. Under present law Smith would have
no possibility of recovering from the manufacturer or retailer of the
ladder, he would probably not be able to recover from the shoe store,
and his prospects of recovering from the optometrist or the local
tavern would be equally remote. Under the proposed new regime,
however, Smith could get compensation for his injuries from the
insurance funded by the producer of the ladder-a company that
made and marketed a product that was sound in design and construction.
The details set out in the blueprint for this novel extension of
the no-fault trade-off are far from complete. O'Connell has noted
many practical problems and has attempted to outline or suggest
possible ways of handling them An alert reader is sure to think of
numerous additional difficulties, but I wager that O'Connell would
be able to devise intriguing means for dealing with these as well. By
the time this exercise is over, however, there will be a strong temptation to conclude that the total prescription is a monumentally complex arrangement for accomplishing a very strange result. Note
again the illustration: a victim recovers under insurance funded by
the manufacturer of a product that is flawless, even though the
accident is bound up with somewhat flawed conduct on the part of
other enterprises or on the part of the victim himself; the legal rights
of the victim are fixed at the option of the manufacturer, with whom
the victim has no direct dealings; and further, the amount of the
victim's recovery is measured after taking account of the other
sources of reparation available to him, although they could not have
been known in advance by the insurer. It is even possible that the
victim himself was not aware that the manufacturer had arranged
things for him in this fashion.
Despite the perplexities of detail, the major outlines of the blueprint are sufficient for exploring the premises that underlie the proposed extension of no-fault insurance arrangements.
' Id. at 145-66.
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O'Connell states the case with vigor.10 The starting proposition
is that it is vitally important to provide victims of misfortune with
the means to get adequate medical treatment and to offset their real
economic losses up to some (moderate) level. The most direct
method for achieving this result would be to enact a comprehensive
social security system that put a floor under income and covered
medical expenditures (with or without the imposition of an abilityto-pay test). Such a program, however, is frightfully expensive even
if illness apart from accidents is excluded; it is admittedly uneconomic in the sense that it does not put pressure on enterprises to
reduce accidents associated with the goods and services they supply;
and, most important, it is not in the cards politically." There is no
denying that over the years more and more protection has been
made available to victims through piecemeal government programs,
employee plans, voluntary insurance policies and the like. Large
gaps in protection nevertheless remain, and O'Connell insists that
a program is needed now to reduce these open spaces. No-fault
insurance plans are designed to serve this purpose. The consumers
of goods and services might well have to bear added costs as a result
of the no-fault coverage. But, O'Connell argues, part of the cost can
be defrayed by eliminating or reducing the need for liability insurance (or its equivalent), part by saving on administrative expenses,
and part by cutting back on the amounts recovered by some victims.
Appealing as this argument might be to those concerned with
the plight of accident victims, it should invite attention to a number
of troublesome questions.
First: To what extent can this reasoning draw support from
economic considerations?
O'Connell correctly notes that broad social security protection
for accident victims, accompanied by the elimination of all tort
liability (except for intentionally caused harms), would be undesirable from an economic point of view because the enterprisers-the
producers and sellers of goods and providers of services-would have
no incentive to hold down accident costs. An uneconomic allocation
of resources would result. Elective or compulsory no-fault insurance,
he believes, could avoid this problem by placing accident costs on
the enterprisers so that they, out of self-interest, would presumably
take measures to reduce their insurance costs by designing safer
products, being more careful, and so forth." In the current vocabu,S For a summary see id. at 171-75.
" Id. at 73-80.
12 Id. at 76-78.
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lary of economics, the accident costs would be internalized to particular enterprises and would not be left external to the commercial
pursuits that gave rise to them.
But, as O'Connell is well aware, this analysis is hardly complete.13 To bring about the optimum allocation of resources in meeting existing consumer demands, it is important both to place accident costs on the "proper" enterprises and to encourage those enterprises to minimize accident costs, but only as calculated after taking account of all the costs of effectuating any improvement in
"safety." There is little reason to believe that the no-fault insurance
program will achieve these ends. Consider again the illustration of
Smith's fall from a well-constructed ladder. It is hard to comprehend how the cost of the accident is attributable to the manufacturer of the ladder; indeed, it seems more reasonable to associate the
cost with the merchant who did a bad job in fitting the shoes, with
the optometrist who was somewhat off-target in prescribing the eyeglasses, with the brewer who concocted (or the tavern that sold) the
beer, or with the lifestyle of Smith himself. If the ladder manufacturer accepts the burden by electing a no-fault plan, one is hard put
to imagine how it would attempt to minimize accident costs. Conceivably it might produce a household ladder that came equipped
with safety straps; but if it thought there was a market for such an
item presumably it would already be producing a deluxe model. To
be sure, if ladders were classed as ultra-hazardous products and
brought under a compulsory no-fault insurance arrangement, the
manufacturer might modify its operations and perhaps adopt the
safety strap feature. But this reclassification could force the company to incur additional costs that far exceeded the accident costs
rationally associated with using ladders (rather than with wearing
shoes or using eyeglasses or drinking beer or doing other things).
One not impressed with economic calculations might nevertheless
accept the extreme view that accident costs connected in any way
with the use of ladders should be placed on the ladder industry. In
that event it should be emphasized that such a position calls upon
consumers of ladders to pay more for safety than they would otherwise consider desirable. And whatever the price of the "improvement," we can now be sure that not all ladder users would snap on
the straps mandated for their safety.14
All this is to point out that O'Connell, despite numerous referId. at 120, 141-44.
,1 Recent experience with automobile seat belts has demonstrated the difficulties involved in compelling the use of safety devices by the public.
13
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ences to the economic aspects of accident costs, cannot and apparently does not expect to get much support for his program from
notions of internalizing rather than externalizing such costs. There
simply is no reason to think that a cluster of no-fault plans for
products and services will yield a "better" allocation of resources
than would a wide-ranging social security program covering all accident victims.
Second: How can an elective no-fault plan, as it applies to
victims who have no choice in the matter, be justified as fair?
Although the election to come under a no-fault plan is to be
made by enterprises that supply goods and services, there is a sense
in which consumers would have a choice concerning no-fault insurance. The purchaser of a ladder, for example, presumably could
choose to buy either a ladder produced or sold by an enterprise that
elected the no-fault option or a ladder produced or sold by firms that
had rejected that option. Inasmuch as the purchaser can be thought
of as representing the household in acquiring the ladder, only a
slight stretch of reality would be required to hold all members of the
purchaser's immediate family to the consequences of his choice.
Perhaps a somewhat greater stretch of mind is necessary to put
borrowers of the ladder or subsequent purchasers of the (used) ladder into the same class as members of the household. Lawyers especially might not be greatly troubled by treating the borrower's rights
as being derived in part from the position occupied by the original
purchaser-lender.
But now consider the total stranger who is severely injured
when Smith, the purchaser, falls off the ladder (while wearing badly
fitting shoes and using mildly inappropriate glasses and having
drunk the beers). Why should the rights (if any) of the victimized
stranger, vis-A-vis the producer of the ladder, turn on Smith's decision to buy a no-fault ladder rather than an uninsured ladder? This
question might elicit a response more quickly when cast in terms of
auto accident victims. Would anyone contend that there is a sound
basis for defining the legal rights of a pedestrian-victim by reference
to whether the owner of the car that hit him had voluntarily chosen
to bring his auto under an elective no-fault plan? Surely that result
would be widely viewed as unjust. The lack of justice would be all
the more sharply perceived if the victim's rights against the
producerof the car were made to turn on the voluntary choice of the
motorist. A variety of legal relationships between auto manufacturers and third-party victims of car accidents are defensible. But there
does not seem to be any reason to have that relationship determined
by an implicit choice made by a motorist in purchasing a car.
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Third: Is no-fault insurance that is tied to lines of products
and services superior to a broad form of accident insurance?
This question goes close to the heart of the O'Connell program.
No-fault insurance, regardless of how it is packaged, is largely accident insurance. In the ladder illustration, the manufacturer took out
the insurance (or was a self-insurer) but Smith, the purchaser of the
product, indirectly paid the premium insofar as the insurance cost
was reflected in the price of the product. The protection of those in
the Smith household is roughly equivalent to that accorded by an
accident policy, bought directly by the Smiths, covering the family
for any accident connected with use of the particular ladder. The
protection that the manufacturer, by electing a no-fault plan, has
accorded parties outside the immediate Smith family or
household-strangers, guests and the like-is also in the nature of
accident insurance; it is protection indirectly charged to Smith for
the benefit of all these other parties.
It is obvious that if elective (or compulsory) no-fault plans for
goods and services gain acceptance, a great array of narrowly defined accident insurance plans will crisscross the society. Such a
result might be desirable if it led to a better allocation of resources
from an economic perspective. As already pointed out, however, the
case for so concluding is weak when no-fault plans are compared
with a system of social security protection for accident victims. The
case seems even weaker when no-fault plans are compared with a
broad-coverage accident insurance arrangement.
A chief virtue of broad-coverage accident insurance is that it
does not call for establishing a multitude of provincial and unavoidably overlapping insurance pools. There is no need to deal here with
the almost endless problems involved in straightening out the
many-faceted relationships among these pools and the manyfaceted relationships between no-fault areas and the areas still governed by traditional tort liability rules. A sufficient glimpse of a few
of these problems might be caught if, in the original illustration, it
is assumed that not only the ladder but also the shoes and the
services of the optometrist, to say nothing of the beer, were covered
by no-fault protection.
Another virtue of broad accident insurance is that premium
rates could be set more rationally than would be possible in a system
that ties accident insurance to particular products and services. To
some extent the differences in accident risks to which various households are exposed could be taken into account. It might be possible,
for example, to reflect in rough fashion the ownership of such goods
as bicycles, bathtubs, stairways and so on. The rates could also be
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accommodated to the number of persons in the household, the distribution of their ages, and the like. And, not least important, the
rates could be adjusted to take account of any medical expense or
economic loss protection already available to the household.
No doubt O'Connell would be delighted if all or almost all
households decided to purchase insurance of this variety-coverage,
it should be noted, not far different from that already developed by
the insurance industry. But of course the fact is that most households are unwilling to buy broad-coverage accident insurance or
enough of it to satisfy O'Connell. To reach the level of his protection
goal it would surely be necessary to compel purchase of an "adequate" amount of accident insurance.
A compulsory plan (which I introduce for analysis rather than
for advocacy) is not wholly visionary. There would clearly be mechanical and administrative obstacles to be overcome in enforcing
the legal obligation to carry protection, but developments in electronic data processing are steadily advancing the practicality of the
scheme. While there are certainly constitutional issues to be resolved, they are not the decisive hang-up at this juncture. The real
barrier is that the legislators are not about to force their constituents
to buy broad-coverage accident insurance, being aware that few
persons not already carrying such insurance are eager to spend their
scarce resources on that commodity. All things considered, in our
society it is much more probable that an enlargement of protection
against misfortunes from accidents will take the form of expansion
in social security coverage, financed through taxation, rather than
compulsory accident insurance, financed through forced payment of
premiums.
Fourth: How is it possible for elective no-fault insurance plans
to succeed if people are unwilling to buy broad-coverage accident
insurance?
Although I doubt that elective no-fault insurance will win any
appreciable acceptance, it is nonetheless worthwhile to speculate as
to why there is even a possibility of its success. The relevant question might be phrased in terms of the ladder illustration: why would
Smith be willing to pay for no-fault ladder accident insurance covering his household and others (and pay for comparable no-fault accident insurance on a wide variety of the goods and services he buys)
but be unwilling to purchase insurance to protect his household in
case of any type of accident?
A possible answer is that Smith might think he is striking a
kind of bargain in which he waives the conditional common law tort
rights that he and other potential victims have against the manufac-
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turer and seller of a flawed ladder in return for the certainty of nofault insurance protection. Smith might even believe that this is an
even exchange so that no reason exists for the price of the ladder to
increase. Perhaps he has read somewhere that the expanded insurance protection is financed by the "savings" derived by cutting
down on the recovery potential for victims under the common law
and by reducing the costs of administering the reparations system.
To test the appeal of such an exchange, a second glance at a
compulsory broad-coverage accident insurance plan is instructive.
Assume this time that the plan is accompanied by the elimination
of all tort liability for products or services (other than responsibility
for intentional harms); assume also that the level of protection
under the plan is set so that the aggregate of funds needed to provide
that amount of protection just equals the "savings" realized from
the elimination of tort liability and from any net reduction in administrative costs that attend the change in systems. Can anyone
seriously believe that today this "bargain" would find widespread
acceptance? I suggest that most people would react negatively because it would sharply offend their sense of "corrective justice"
5
toward accident victims, a sense that still permeates our society.'
Another possible reason for believing that elective no-fault
might succeed is that the relevant economic calculation will not be
performed, or performed correctly, by the typical consumer. In buying the ladder of company X, which has opted for no-fault, instead
of buying a comparable ladder made by company Y, which has
rejected no-fault, Smith probably cannot determine how much he
is paying for the no-fault coverage. Suppose, however, that manufacturer X markets its product both with and without no-fault protection, permanently marking each ladder with an appropriate notation. It is not unreasonable to assume that a protected unit would
bear a higher price tag than an unprotected unit. Again it should
be asked whether many consumers would buy this insurance-not
only on ladders, but on bathtubs, bicycles and so on. If the typical
person would be resistant to buying general accident insurance, it
is a good guess that he would be at least equally opposed to paying
for no-fault coverage on a host of particular goods and services.
" An illustration from O'Connell may be helpful in demonstrating this proposition.
O'Connell reports that, at a symposium on no-fault insurance, he was asked what recovery
would be granted to a retiree who lost an arm to a defective power tool manufactured by a
company that had opted for the no-fault trade-off. O'Connell's reply was, that since the
victim had no out-of-pocket damages (he had no earnings to lose and his medical expenses
were presumably taken care of by Medicare), he would recover nothing. J. O'CONNELL at 118.
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But perhaps not. The average consumer-and here the crux of
the no-fault strategy is conceivably close at hand-may be misled
by the seemingly small "extra" charge for each item on his shopping
list. Having in mind these purchasers, as well as those who are
simply unable to ascertain the amount of any buried surcharge, it
is possible that producers and sellers of goods and suppliers of services will conclude that the election of a no-fault plan is an economic
decision in their own best interests.
If this is indeed the ultimate hope for the success of elective nofault plans, I find little cause for rejoicing. Adequate protection for
accident victims (as well as victims of other misfortunes) is a commendable goal for society, and in forcefully reminding us of many
shortcomings in the present state of things Jeffrey O'Connell performs an important role. But if the goal cannot be attained openly
and directly-as by the extension of social security or the imposition
of a broad-coverage accident insurance plan-should we sneak up
on that goal by fooling an unsuspecting public through a complicated maze of price adjustments that defy understanding?
Such a policy, I submit, would not end, but rather would add,
insult to injury.

